The EU Data Retention Directive compelled telephone and Internet companies to retain traffic and location data as well as related data necessary to identify the subscriber or user for the purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, such as, in particular, organised crime and terrorism.

The European Court of Justice had to issue a preliminary ruling concerning the validity of Directive 2006/24/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006. The request addressed to the European Court has its origin in a case triggered in Ireland by Digital Rights Ireland. The Court joined this case with another request made by the Austrian Constitutional Court concerning the compatibility with the Federal Constitutional Law of the law transposing Directive 2006/24 into Austrian national law.

The Court has found that data retention entails a wide ranging and particularly serious interference with the fundamental right to privacy... "The Court observes first of all that the data to be retained makes it possible, in particular :

• to know the identity of the person with whom a subscriber or registered user has communicated and by what means,
• to identify the time of the communication as well as the place from which that communication took place and
• to know the frequency of the communications of the subscriber or registered user with certain persons during a given period."

"Those data, taken as a whole, may provide very precise information on the private lives of the persons whose data are retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, activities carried out, social relationships and the social environments frequented."

"The Court takes the view that, by requiring the retention of those data and by allowing the competent national authorities to access those data, the directive interferes in a particularly serious manner with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data."

La directive sur la conservation des données prévoit que les compagnies téléphoniques et les fournisseurs d'accès à Internet doivent conserver les données relatives au trafic, les données de localisation ainsi que les données connexes nécessaires pour identifier l'abonné ou l'utilisateur, tout cela à des fins de prévention, de recherche, de détection et de poursuite des infractions graves, comme notamment les infractions liées à la criminalité organisée et au terrorisme.

La Cour européenne de justice a émis une décision préjudicielle portant sur la validité de la directive 2006/24/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 15 mars 2006. La demande présentée à la Cour européenne trouve son origine dans une affaire déclenchée par Digital Rights Ireland. La Cour a joint cette affaire à une autre question préjudicielle introduite par la Cour constitutionnelle autrichienne concernant la compatibilité de la loi transposant la directive 2006/24 dans le droit interne autrichien avec la loi constitutionnelle fédérale.

La Cour a décidé que la conservation des données constitue une ingérence d'une vaste ampleur et d'une gravité particulière dans les droits fondamentaux au respect de la vie privée. "La Cour constate tout d'abord que les données à conserver permettent notamment de savoir:

• avec quelle personne et par quel moyen un abonné ou un utilisateur inscrit a communiqué
• de déterminer le temps de la communication ainsi que l'endroit à partir duquel celle-ci a eu lieu et
• de connaître la fréquence des communications de l'abonné ou de l'utilisateur inscrit avec certaines personnes pendant une période donnée."

"Ces données, prises dans leur ensemble, sont susceptibles de fournir des indications très précises sur la vie privée des personnes dont les données sont conservées, comme les habitudes de la vie quotidienne, les lieux de séjour permanents ou temporaires, les déplacements journaliers ou autres, les activités exercées, les relations sociales et les milieux sociaux fréquentés."

"La Cour estime qu'en imposant la conservation de ces données et en en permettant l'accès aux autorités nationales compétentes, la directive s'immisce de manière particulièrement grave dans les droits fondamentaux au respect de la vie privée et à la protection des données à caractère personnel."

Négocié plutôt que débattu démocratiquement, ACTA contourne les parlements et est une véritable feuille de route pour des projets comme SOPA et PIPA, imposerait de nouvelles sanctions pénales et des mesures poussant les acteurs de l'Internet à « coopérer » avec les industries du divertissement pour surveiller et censurer les communications en ligne, en contournant l'autorité judiciaire.

Cet accord est donc une menace majeure pour la liberté d'expression en ligne et est porteur d'insécurité juridique pour les acteurs de l'Internet.

Le Parlement européen a désormais une occasion ultime de rejeter l'ACTA... Après avoir annoncé qu'il recommanderait le rejet de l'ACTA, le rapporteur britanique David Martin (S&D) tient ses engagements : son projet de rapport appelle le Parlement à refuser de « donner son consentement » à ACTA et souligne que « les bénéfices attendus de cet accord international sont largement inférieurs aux menaces qu'il fait peser sur les libertés civiles ».

Tout en soulignant les principaux dangers de l'ACTA, David Martin réconforte cependant les lobbies du copyright, des brevets et du droits des marques...

La conclusion du projet de rapport de M. Martin appelle la Commission européenne de « faire de nouvelles propositions pour protéger la propriété intellectuelle ».

Cela est aussi une source d'inquiétude au regard des projets de la Commission, qui s'apprête à réviser la Directive anti-partage IPRED (Acronyme pour: Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive) pour accentuer la répression des infractions en ligne au droit d'auteur...

Le vote sur ACTA en plénière au Parlement européen devrait avoir lieu au mois de juillet voire en septembre...

En attendant, « le Parlement doit absolument résister aux pressions exercées par la Commission et protéger ses prérogatives »...

Plus dérangeant encore, sans même attendre la décision du Parlement européen d'accepter ou non ACTA, le Commissaire Michel Barnier, en charge du Marché intérieur, fait déjà pression en faveur de nouvelles mesures répressives en matière de droit d'auteur, similaires à celles prévues par les lois SOPA et PIPA aux États-Unis.

Last February 16th, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that a social network “cannot be obliged to install a general filtering system, covering all its users, in order to prevent the unlawful use of musical and audio-visual work”.

SABAM brought the social network Netlog to court to impose an injunction requiring the installation of filtering systems aimed at the prevention of infringements committed by its Belgian members (around 2 million consumers) on its website.

A social network is a set of online communication tools that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content. Netlog is an online platform, where members can create their own webpage with a blog, pictures, playlists, videos… and as such considered as a social network, and a hosting provider...

The SABAM v. Netlog judgment represents a new win for fundamental freedoms.

Particularly now, in a political climate where the foundations of the current Internet are at stake, the European judges have re-emphasised the importance of not overburdening communication tools with restrictive technologies. This is crucial to protect the fundamental rights value of the Internet as well as its economic significance.

For the second time in a just a few months, thanks to actions taken by SABAM have led the Court of Justice of the EU to underline the importance of an open and free Internet and the respect for fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom of communication privacy and the freedom to conduct business.

But what is the difference between the Scarlet case and the Netlog decision?. The wording of the questions was the same in both cases except that the Netlog decision specifically addresses the situation of hosting providers, while the Scarlet case involved Internet access providers...

In the Scarlet case, the issue was about an access provider, a "mere conduit" (a service consisting of "transmission" in a communication network) in the language of the E-Commerce Directive.

SABAM wanted the ISP Scarlet to install a generalised filtering system for all incoming and outgoing electronic communications passing through its services and to block potentially unlawful communications.

The draft proposal was scheduled to be officially released in late January after it was leaked in December 2011.

According to various sources, the proposal received negative responses from several Directorates-General over the course of the 'inter-service consultation,' some of whom have voiced their concern that the proposed new framework would be stricter than the current legal framework and thus may have a negative impact on businesses.

For example, parts of the proposal, such as the right to be forgotten, are viewed by some as potentially too burdensome for companies.

The delay in the release date for the proposal will push back the formal adoption of the draft proposal by the European Commission.

Viviane Reding, Justice Commissioner and Commission Vice-President, is said to be working on a communication in which she will outline several key goals and objectives for the draft proposal. The draft proposal has not yet entered into the legislative process and may undergo substantial changes before it reaches that stage."

European Digital Rights informs that "right at the end of the inter-service consultation process in the European Commission (the almost final step before a legislative proposal is launched), the United States Department of Commerce launched a significant lobbying campaign against the leaked draft proposal for a Data Protection Regulation. The campaign included high-level phone calls from senior figures in the US Department of Commerce to top level staff in the European Commission covering topics such as US business, multilateral and bilateral treaty organizations, PNR, national security, law enforcement, trade and innovation."

"In general, the US complained about the draft proposal arguing that it will break with international standards and might even end up being counterproductive for data protection..."

European Digital Rights has analized the most prominent exaggerations and misunderstandings in the US paper, namely those pertaining to interoperability, data breach requirements, right to be forgotten, definition of "child", adequacy, regulatory enforcement and international cooperation.

Although the agreement cannot take effect without the approval of the European Parliament and the Council, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) could read the proposed agreement only in a sealed room where they could not take notes or make copies.

The complete text on which the European Parliament will vote has finally been made public, revealing a failure to address the concerns raised by the Parliament and continued shortfalls in data protection, due process, and protection of fundamental rights.

In its resolution of 5 May 2010, the Parliament said that the Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreement should take the form of a treaty, recognize the fundamental right to freedom of movement, prohibit the use of PNR data for data mining or profiling, and take into consideration "PNR data which may be available from sources not covered by international agreements, such as computer reservation systems located outside the EU."

The proposed agreement does not meet these criteria, and does not mention any of these issues...

In view of the upcoming vote on the EU-USA PNR Agreement, the Austrian Organization for the Use of the Internet and NoPNR.org, with the endorsement, among others, of The Identity Project, Friends of Privacy USA, Center for Financial Privacy and Human Rights, Statewatch and Privacy International, sent an Open Letter to the European Parliament asking its Members to consider the following issues for their decision on the EU-US PNR Agreement:

• The proposed agreement will not result in improved legal security for citizens
• There is no access control or access logging
• The proposed agreement does not meet the conditions set by the European Parliament
• There is no appropriate information to travelers

The first, filed by Khalid El-Masri in September 2009, claims unlawful abduction and mistreatment by the Macedonian Ministry of the Interior.

The second was filed by Abd Al-Rahim al Nashiri for alleged mistreatment during his detention at a secret prison (“black site”) in Poland...

The third, most recent case was filed against Lithuania by Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn (“Abu Zubaydah”) for alleged secret detention and torture by CIA agents committed at a Lithuanian black site...

El-Masri’s petition alleges that Macedonia violated Article 3 (prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the European Convention on Human Rights by failing to intervene during his torture and inhuman treatment by CIA agents in Macedonia; by allowing him to be transported to Afghanistan with the knowledge that he would be tortured and inhumanly treated at the destination; and by failing to investigate his arrest, detention, and transfer to the CIA by Macedonian authorities.

Additionally, El-Masri claims that his detention by Macedonian authorities for twenty-three days, along with his transfer to CIA agents, violated his right to liberty and security of person (Article 5), and that the failure by the Macedonian criminal courts to hear his case violated his right to remedy guaranteed by Article 13 of the Convention.

Regarding Al Nashiri, his petition alleges violations of Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 5 (liberty and security of person), 8 (right to private and family life), 10 (freedom of expression), and 13 (right to remedy) of the Convention, and Protocol 6 to the Convention (abolition of the death penalty)...

If the Court accepts El-Masri’s and/or al Nashiri’s applications, both the applicants and the member states will be invited to present their claims before the Court. Should the Court find that a member state has violated the Convention, it may issue a declaratory judgment, order payment of damages and legal costs, or implement other measures of reparation.

Britain's largest police force is operating covert surveillance technology that can masquerade as a mobile phone network, transmitting a signal that allows authorities to shut off phones remotely, intercept communications and gather data about thousands of users in a targeted area.

The surveillance system has been procured by the Metropolitan police from Leeds-based company Datong plc, which counts the US Secret Service, the Ministry of Defence and regimes in the Middle East among its customers.

Strictly classified under government protocol as "Listed X", it can emit a signal over an area of up to an estimated 10 sq km, forcing hundreds of mobile phones per minute to release their unique identity codes, which can be used to track a person's movements in real time.

The disclosure has caused concern among lawyers and privacy groups that large numbers of innocent people could be unwittingly implicated in covert intelligence gathering...

Nick Pickles, director of privacy and civil liberties campaign group Big Brother Watch, warned the technology could give police the ability to conduct "blanket and indiscriminate" monitoring... He added that "Such invasive surveillance must be tightly regulated, authorised at the highest level and only used in the most serious of investigations. It should be absolutely clear that only data directly relating to targets of investigations is monitored or stored." [...]

Regarding the investigatory powers act, lawyers have condemned what appears to be deception of the courts by undercover police and have called for fundamental reforms of the legislation governing covert operations.

"The revelation that a constable who infiltrated protest groups gave false evidence in court under oath triggered demands for a review of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (Ripa)...

Gordon Nardell QC, who is leading the Bar Council's working party on the operation of Ripa, said that “At the moment the law allows the police to target legally privileged communications between lawyer and client”. "The Bar Council thinks that is fundamentally wrong and creates a risk of miscarriages of justice. People accused of crime must be able to speak freely with their lawyer in the knowledge that what they say is kept from the ears of the investigating authorities.”

The Directive applies to traffic and location data and the "related data necessary to identify" a user. Each EU member state must retain this data for a period of six months to two years from the date of the user's communication.

The Directive also requires each EU member state to enact procedures that grant law enforcement access to the data. According to Hustinx, the Directive does not provide clear guidance about why this data must be retained or who will have access to it.

Similarly, Hustinx believes that the Directive does not sufficiently justify the necessity of the data retention, lacks foreseeability, and is overly intrusive. He also notes that statistics on access requests indicate that a retention period of up to two years 'goes far beyond' what is necessary. In light of these concerns, Hustinx has asked the European Commission to consider all other options, 'including the possibility of repealing the Directive.' [...]

On 26 September 2011, European Digital Rights and 37 other NGOs from 14 countries sent a letter to Commissioners Malmström, Kroes and Reding on the review of the Data Retention Directive.

In their communique informing of the sending of the letter, European Digital Rights states “The central mistake which we would like not to see repeated is the fallacy that all uses of retained data can be used to argue that the Directive is valuable. In reality, recently generated data is more likely to be used in investigations and such data would have been available anyway even if the Directive had never existed.”

The letter also draws attention to some of the core problems with the Directive, such as the lack of a harmonised definition of "serious crime" (and the far reaching consequences of this) and the lack of a harmonised approach to access and security.

EDRi recalls that "Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states that limitations of fundamental rights must not restrict or reduce the right in such a way or to such extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled similarly on numerous occasions."

Ironically, the Directive was proposed as a measure to harmonise the approach to this policy in the European Union - even though few countries had such a policy to begin with. It managed to disharmonise the single market, by forcing the policy onto 27 countries, with vastly varying retention periods, rules for cost reimbursement, etc.

Ostensibly, these 'smart sanctions' (which target groups and individuals rather than whole populations) are designed to disrupt the activities of terrorist groups by criminalising their members, cutting off their access to funds and undermining their support.

In practice, however, far too many people have been included in national and international terrorism lists. At the same time, they have been systematically denied the possibility of mounting a meaningful defence to the allegations against them. Moreover, many listings are clearly politically or ideologically motivated, undermining genuine counter-terrorism efforts and paralysing conflict resolution efforts.

The UN blacklisting regime stems from UN Security Council Resolution 1267, which created the first list of alleged terrorists "associated with Osama bin Laden, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda". [...]

The EU's terrorist lists stem from the measures it took to transpose Resolution 1373 into EU law and currently stands at 57 individuals and 47 organisations. In addition to the UN and EU lists, many states have adopted domestic blacklists, massively expanding the net of criminalisation.

Whereas the EU has adopted a particularly broad definition of ‘terrorism’, the UN has failed to reach such an understanding, despite decades of deliberation. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 thus effectively outsources the definition of terrorism to nation states, encouraging the criminalisation of groups on the basis of geopolitical, foreign policy or diplomatic interests.

The criminalisation of self-determination movements that has resulted has transformed the migrant and Diaspora communities that support them into ‘suspect communities’ and obstructed peace processes aimed at resolving such conflicts.

There is now an irrefutable body of expert legal opinion that views international proscription regimes as incompatible with the most basic standards of due process. The adverse and unacceptable impact of the sanctions on fundamental human rights is also abundantly clear and systemic violations have been recognised repeatedly in judicial proceedings, particularly within Europe.

Net neutrality refers to the issue of whether Internet service providers (ISPs) should be allowed to monitor network traffic to filter or restrict Internet access, for example to block specific services or applications (for example peer to peer) or give preference access to others.

On October 7th, 2011 the EDPS, Peter Hustinx, released an opinion on the European Commission Communication on the open internet and net neutrality in Europe, a communication that had been adopted by the Commission on April 19th, 2011. (The Supervisor is an independent supervisory authority devoted to protecting personal data and privacy and promoting good practice in the EU institutions and bodies).

According to "La Quadrature du Net", an European advocacy group that promotes the rights and freedoms of citizens on the Internet, the EDPS's opinion on Net neutrality is a ground-breaking opinion. "He stresses that restrictions to Internet access inevitably harm privacy".

As the European Parliament enters in the final stage of the negotiations on its resolution on Net neutrality, this opinion underlines that the EU Commission's "wait and see" approach is bound to fail and is unjustifiable. Members of the EU Parliament - who will soon hold a crucial vote on the matter - must preserve citizens' privacy by requiring strong regulatory measures to ban discrimination of online communications.

In fact, the "Industry Committee" of the European Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution last October 20th demanding that the European Commission promptly assess the need for further legislative action...

La Quadrature du Net considers that the resolution passed by the Industry Committee is overall a positive text. However, the resolution falls short of asking for immediate legislative action to protect Net neutrality and for sanctions against Internet Service Providers who restrict access to the Internet. It also includes a loophole, which risks being interpreted as accepting such restrictions on mobile Internet on the pretext of alleged network congestion.

Jérémie Zimmermann, spokesperson for La Quadrature du Net, said that “While rather weak, the adopted resolution is a political commitment from the European Parliament in favour of Net neutrality, and aims to prevent telecom operators from restricting Internet access. Pressure is increasing on Commissioner Neelie Kroes and the EU telecoms regulators to come up with further legislation. Mrs Kroes must break away from her 'wait and see' approach and take action to effectively protect competition, innovation as well as citizens' freedom of expression and privacy online".

The draft guidelines on "Net Neutrality and Transparency" proposed by the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) in October 2011, have actually nothing to do with Net neutrality according to privacy groups, and instead readily accept that telecom operators can restrict access to the Internet as long as users are informed. They only prove that mere transparency and competition will not prevent operators from violating Net neutrality.

The Directive requires service provider to keep communications data concerning: phone-calls, faxes, mobile phone calls (including location) and internet usage (it should be noted that the monitoring of internet usage also reveals the content).

This highly controversial legislation was passed in 2006, its path cleared by the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid. Both these occasions provided the Council with the opportunity to introduce EU-wide data retention measures

Perhaps the most well-known comment on the Data Retention Directive is that of the European Data Protection Supervisor, who referred to it as “the most privacy invasive instrument ever adopted by the EU in terms of scale and the number of people it affects.” This statement reinforced the arguments made by numerous civil society organisations, individuals and politicians.

It is because of the highly invasive nature of the surveillance and monitoring permitted by mandatory data retention that the directive was annulled or suspended by court decisions in several Member States...

However, the idea that data retention and greater surveillance of telecommunications will help in the “fight against terrorism” is persistent, and seems to be resonating across Europe. The situation in Norway and the failure of police and security services to prevent the attacks has given rise to a number of arguments for enhanced surveillance of the internet.

At the EU level, there remains a significant lobby opposing any comprehensive re-thinking of how data retention should work, or whether it is necessary at all.

A number of Member States are strongly in favour of retaining the Directive as it stands – a recent leaked paper drafted by France, Ireland and the UK states that data retention "has played a key role in maintaining public security throughout Europe."

The paper attempts to justify current data retention legislation on numerous grounds, not least through recounting tales of specific cases where retained data has been successfully utilised.

Yet it may have been entirely possible to solve these cases without mandatory, blanket retention of all telecommunications information by targeting suspects. Alternative options include a process known as “quick-freeze”, whereby law enforcement bodies are able to ensure the retention of specific telecommunications data after an investigation has begun.

The differences between Member States were reflected at a recent meeting of the Working Party on Data Protection and Information Exchange...

The total value of funds for the 2012 programme for the supply of food for the most deprived persons in the EU has been set at 113 million Euros, a sharp reduction from the near € 500 million awarded in recent years. The 2012 food aid scheme will be based exclusively on existing intervention stocks.

The scheme to distribute free food to the most deprived persons in the Community was launched as an emergency measure in the exceptionally cold winter of 1986/87, when surplus stocks of agricultural produce were given to Member State charities for distribution to people in need. The measure was subsequently formalised and based on intervention stocks.

As a result of the reform process that the Common Agricultural Policy has undergone since the early 1990s, large surplus stocks are now non-existent.

The phasing-down of systematic intervention on the markets, together with a growth in demand for staple food products, means that only small quantities are now available for the "Most Deprived" scheme. To ensure that the scheme could continue, it was amended in 1995 to allow the surplus stocks to be complemented by a financial contribution, when this was necessary...

In 2008 the Commission proposed not to limit the purchase of food aid just to times when intervention stocks are not available. Such purchases accounted for 90% of the resources allocated for the 2009 programme... Germany however challenged the practice of market purchasing, stating that the decision to purchase food for the poor falls under social policy and is therefore a national competence. The Court of Justice followed the German reasoning in its ruling last April 13th. This led to the annulment of the European provisions allowing market purchases...

The 2012 scheme will thus be based exclusively on existing intervention stocks, with member states receiving less than a quarter of what they received in earlier years. The six countries opposed to the continuation of the program for 2012-2013 are Germany, the United Kingdom, Holland, The Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden.

The Commission, which has been in charge of negotiating the agreement with the USA, has circulated the final agreement prior to formally submitting it to the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament for their agreement. This draft was distributed among Delegations on May 20th, 2011.

Said agreement has not been amended to meet the concerns of the Legal Service. Formally, the European Parliament cannot amend the agreement but it has to agree it - in effect, the parliament can veto the planned Agreement.

The European Commission's Legal Service Note says that the Legal Service has reviewed the draft agreement in respect of fundamental rights and: "considers that there are grave doubts as to its compatibility with the fundamental right to data protection." It concludes in fact that the Legal Service "does not consider the agreement in its present form as compatible with fundamental rights." [...]

On this matter, Tony Bunyan, Statewatch Director, comments:

"Secret Minutes of EU-US meetings since 2001 show that they have always been a one-way channel with the US setting the agenda by making demands on the EU. When the EU does make rare requests like on data protection, because US law only offers protection and redress to US citizens, they are bluntly told that the the US is not going to change its data protection system - as they were at the EU-US Justine and Home Affairs Ministerial Meeting in Washington on 8-9 December 2010.

This Agreement does not meet EU data protection standards of proportionality or purpose limitation, nor does it provide judicial redress to data subjects or any guarantee of independent oversight.

Controlling your information, having access to your data, being able to modify or delete it – these are essential rights that have to be guaranteed in today's world.

The European Commission announced on November 4th, 2010, a strategy to "protect individuals' data in all policy areas, including law enforcement, while reducing red tape for business and guaranteeing the free circulation of data within the EU.

The key goals include, as the Electronic Privacy Information Center informs, "strengthening the rights of individuals, enhancing the free flow of information, extending privacy safeguards to police and criminal justice records systems, ensuring high levels of protection for data transferred outside of the European Union, and more effective enforcement of privacy rules. The new policy will build on the 1995 EU Data Directive which is the foundation for much of privacy law across Europe".

The current regulatory framework is basically provided by the Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and the Council, of October 24th 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data". This general Data Protection Directive has been complemented by other legal instruments, such as the e-Privacy Directive for the communications sector..

In 2009, the Commission launched a review of the current legal framework on data protection, starting with a high-level conference in May 2009, followed by a public consultation running until the end of 2009. Targeted stakeholders consultations were organised throughout 2010.

This policy review will be used by the European Commission with the results of a public consultation to revise the EU’s 1995 Data Protection Directive. Public submissions and comments can be made on the European Commission’s public consultation website until January 15, 2011.

Building on this, the Commission will present proposals for a new general data protection legal framework in 2011, which will then need to be negotiated and adopted by the European Parliament and the Council...

Strategy papers for geographic and thematic programmes, as well as multi-annual indicative programmes drafted by the Commission for the external co-operation instruments "shall be adopted by means of delegated acts", according to amendments approved by the Foreign Affairs, Development and International Trade committees.

This would give the European Parliament a de facto veto, by enabling it to block these strategy papers and multiannual programmes and require the Commission to present amended proposals.

All five reports were adopted at first reading without any agreement having been reached with the Council and Commission on the most contentious issue, relating to the application of delegated acts. These reports pertain to the Instrument for Stability, the financing instrument for development cooperation, the financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide and the financing instrument for cooperation with industrialised countries.

One day before, on October 20th, the European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso signed in Strasbourg the revised Framework Agreement governing working relations between the two institutions. The signature brings to a successful conclusion a process that started almost one year ago with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The revised Framework Agreement adapts the existing accord from 2005 to the new Treaty framework.

El PE reitera su posición de que las transferencias de datos en masa significan una divergencia con respecto a los principios en los que se basa la legislación y la práctica de la UE, por lo que pide a la Comisión y al Consejo "que traten debidamente este asunto en las negociaciones".

Considera que las soluciones deben incluir la restricción del alcance de los datos transferidos y la enumeración de los tipos de datos que los proveedores designados pueden filtrar y extraer, así como los tipos de datos que pueden incluirse en una transferencia...

Los diputados recalcan que la opción que ofrecería "el máximo nivel de garantías" sería permitir que la extracción de datos tuviera lugar en territorio de la UE, por parte de servicios de la UE o de servicios conjuntos gestionados por la UE y Estados Unidos. A medio plazo, una autoridad judicial de la UE debería supervisar la extracción de datos...

A finales de febrero de 2010 los ministros de asuntos Exteriores de la UE pusieron fin definitivamente al acuerdo provisional de transferencia de datos bancarios de la UE a Estados Unidos a través de la red SWIFT, tras el rechazo expresado por el Parlamento Europeo el 11 de febrero. Para los eurodiputados, el acuerdo no ofrecía garantías suficientes en cuanto a protección de los datos de los ciudadanos europeos. Cuestiones como la privacidad, la proporcionalidad y la reciprocidad preocuparon al PE... La resolución de rechazo fue aprobada por 378 votos a favor, 196 en contra y 31 abstenciones.

Los eurodiputados consideran imprescindible que este tipo de datos sólo sean consultados en el marco de actuaciones antiterroristas, y subrayan la necesidad de encontrar el equilibrio entre la seguridad y el respeto de las libertades fundamentales. Además, lamentan que no se consultara al Parlamento Europeo sobre el acuerdo, y que éste fuera ratificado tan sólo un día antes de la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa, que hace obligatoria la entrada en escena de la Eurocámara...

En lo que se refiere a los datos de pasajeros aéreos, el PE también aprobó en su sesión de 05may10 una Resolución sobre el inicio de las negociaciones para los acuerdos relativos al registro de nombres de los pasajeros (PNR) con los Estados Unidos, Australia y Canadá... Subraya que la Unión Europea se basa en el Estado de Derecho y que todas las transferencias de datos personales de la UE y sus Estados miembros a terceros países por motivos de seguridad deben basarse en acuerdos internacionales con categoría de actos legislativos, con el fin de ofrecer a los ciudadanos de la UE las salvaguardias necesarias, respetar las garantías procesales y el derecho de defensa, y cumplir la legislación relativa a la protección de datos a escala nacional y europea...

Otra área en donde el derecho de los ciudadanos europeos a la protección de datos se ve afectado, es lo que tiene que ver con el mandato de la Agencia Europea para la Gestión de la Cooperación Operativa en las Fronteras Exteriores de los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea, conocida como Frontex, que tiene sede en Varsovia, Polonia.

In March of this year the Prosecutor's Office of Munich filed charges against him and issued an arrest order which, according to media reports, concerns his complicity in the murder of 29,000 Jews in Sobibor concentration camp in occupied Poland.

Radio Nizkor has decided to do a specific programme to clarify some of the issues concerning existing, substantially irrefutable, evidence, and to set out the history of his crimes with respect to the Nazi extermination camps. [...]

Demjanjuk entered the United States in 1952 in reliance on the Law of Displaced Persons and obtained citizenship in 1958.

The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio concluded on 21 February 2002 that Demjanjuk's citizenship should be revoked... On 28th December 2005 the then Chief Immigration Judge Michael J. Creppy, issued a removal order in respect of Demjanjuk... The countries included in the order were Ukraine or, in the alternative, Germany or Poland.

These proceedings came to an end on 19th May 2008, when the US Supreme Court rejected Demjanjuk's petition for certiorari.

On 19th June 2008, various survivors and relatives of Spanish victims of the National-Socialist regime, represented by Equipo Nizkor, filed criminal proceedings in the National Court (Audiencia Nacional) in Madrid against John Demjanjuk and three other SS... Also on 19th June 2008 the German authorities announced their interest in seeking the handover of Demjanjuk from the United States [...]

Demjanjuk's service as an armed guard in Nazi concentration camps was documented in the course of the denaturalization proceedings initiated by the US Government in 1999.

The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio which concluded in 2002 that Demjanjuk's citizenship should be revoked, relied, in reaching this conclusion, not only on official and original wartime documents - such as his identity card as a guard- but also on the professional reports of an expert on the SS Totenkopf and on this type of documentation - Charles W. Sydnor...

Dr. Sydnor prepared an expert report for this Court, followed by two supplementary reports. All of them were provided to the Spanish National Court by the relevant US authorities in December 2008 in a response to a request for judicial assistance - an International Rogatory Commission - issued by the Central Investigating Court No. 2. They form part of the documentary evidence which has been officially supplied by the US authorities.

This expert's conclusions, accepted as admissible facts by the US Courts insofar as they concern Demjanjuk's service as an armed guard in Nazi concentration camps are as follows:

"Iwan Demjanjuk entered German service as a guard auxiliary at Trawniki Training Camp in mid-1942. Shortly after his arrival, he received Trawniki identification number 1393 and the camp administration created Dienstausweis No. 1393 for him. Demjanjuk was issued a uniform and a rifle at Trawniki and he received training there. He also received the rank of Wachmann (guard private). On 22 September 1942, he deployed to the Manorial Estate Okzow, where he served as a guard. After this service, he returned to Trawniki and deployed to the concentration camp in Lublin commonly known as Majdanek, where he served during the winter of 1942-43. At Majdanek, Demjanjuk guarded prisoners and prevented them from escaping. On 18 January 1943, he was apprehended returning to the camp after leaving the grounds in violation of the typhus quarantine then in effect. He was punished for this infraction on 21 January. After his service at Majdanek, Demjanjuk returned to Trawniki. On 26 March 1943, the Germans ordered his deployment to the SS Special Detachment Sobibor. He arrived at Sobibor on 26 or 27 March 1943 and served there for some period of time. During his service at Sobibor, Demjanjuk guarded prisoners and prevented them from escaping. He also participated in the extermination process that was Sobibor's raison d'être. Afterwards he returned to Trawniki. On 1 October 1943, the Germans ordered Demjanjuk's transfer to Flossenbürg Concentration Camp. He arrived there by 8 October, when he was again issued a rifle, along with a bayonet. Demjanjuk served at Flossenburg until at least 10 December 1944, that is, for at least fourteen months. During his service there, he guarded prisoners and prevented them from escaping. [...]

The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio established that "[G]overnment Exhibit 3 is a service identity pass from Trawniki Training Camp, issued in the name of Iwan Demjanjuk, identification number 1393" and that "Government Exhibit 3 is an Authentic German Wartime Document Issued to Defendant" and that it "is in a condition that raises no suspicion as to its authenticity."

It is worth highlighting that in February 2009 the Prosecutor's Office in Munich again submitted this document to further forensic tests and after satisfying itself as to its authenticity proceeded a few days later to demand the handover of Demjanjuk.

With reference to Demjanjuk's service at Flossenbürg Concentration Camp, where more than 150 Spaniards were imprisoned, the Court considered that: "The 'Iwan Demjanjuk' identified at entry 53 on the Flossenburg transfer roster is the same Trawniki-trained guard identified on Service Identity Pass No. 1393..."

La Fiscalía de Munich formuló cargos en su contra, librándose la correspondiente orden de detención en marzo de 2009, según información periodística por su complicidad en el asesinato de 29.000 judíos en el campo de concentración de Sobibor, en la Polonia ocupada.

Radio Nizkor ha decidido hacer un programa específico donde se clarifiquen algunos extremos con relación a las pruebas existentes, así como un resumen de su historia penal con relación a varios campos de exterminio nacionalsocialistas. [...]

Demjanjuk entró en Estados Unidos en 1952 en virtud de la Ley sobre Personas Desplazadas y obtuvo su ciudadanía en 1958.

El Tribunal de Distrito para el Distrito Norte de Ohio concluyó el 21feb02 que Demjanjuk obtuvo ilegalmente su naturalización en 1958, al ocultar su pasado de persecución, por lo que ordenó la revocación de la misma. El 28dic05 un juez de Inmigración ordernó su deportación a Ucrania, o alternativamente, Alemania o Polonia.

Este procedimiento concluyó el 19may08, con la denegación por parte del Tribunal Supremo de los EE.UU. de la petición de certiorari realizada por la defensa de Demjanjuk.

El 19jun08varios sobrevivientes y familiares de víctimas españolas del régimen nacionalsocialista representados por el Equipo Nizkor, interpusieron una querella penal ante la Audiencia Nacional española contra cuatro SS, entre ellos John Demjanjuk. Ese mismo día las autoridades alemanas anunciaban su interés en solicitar la entrega de Demjanjuk a los Estados Unidos. [...]

El servicio prestado por Demjanjuk como guardia armado en campos de concentración nacionalsocialistas ha quedado acreditado en el marco del procedimiento de desnaturalización iniciado por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos en 1999.

El Tribunal de Distrito para el Distrito Norte de Ohio que concluyó en 2002 que la naturalización de Demjanjuk debía ser revocada, se apoyó para llegar a esta conclusión, además de en documentos oficiales y originales de la época -como la tarjeta identificativa de guardia- en los informes periciales del experto en las SS Totenkopf y perito en ese tipo de documentos, Charles W. Sydnor...

El Dr. Sydnor realizó para este tribunal varios informes periciales que han sido también aportados por las autoridades competentes estadounidenses en respuesta a la solicitud de asistencia judicial cursada por el JCI No. 2 de la Audiencia Nacional española en noviembre de 2008, formando parte estos documentos probatorios de la serie de documentos enviados oficialmente por dicha autoridad.

La conclusión de este experto, aceptada después como hechos por los tribunales estadounidenses, en lo que se refiere al servicio prestado por Demjanjuk como guardia armado en campos de concentración nacionalsocialistas, es la siguiente:

"Iwan Demjanjuk comenzó a prestar servicios para los alemanes como guardia auxiliar en el Campo de Entrenamiento de Trawniki a mediados de 1942. Poco después de su llegada, recibió el número de identificación 1393 de Trawniki y la administración del campo creó para él la Dienstausweis nº 1393. Demjanjuk recibió en Trawniki un uniforme y un rifle, así como entrenamiento. Le fue asignado el rango de Wachmann. El 22 de septiembre de 1942, fue trasladado a la hacienda Okzow, donde sirvió como guardia. Tras este servicio, regresó a Trawniki para ser asignado al campo de concentración de Lublin, comúnmente conocido como Majdanek, donde sirvió durante el invierno de 1942-43... Tras su servicio en Majdanek, Demjanjuk regresó a Trawniki. El 26 de marzo de 1943, los alemanes ordenaron su asignación al Destacamento Especial de las SS en Sobibor. Llegó a Sobibor el 26 o el 27 de marzo de 1943, y sirvió en este campo durante un tiempo. Durante su servicio en Sobibor, Demjanjuk vigilaba prisioneros y evitaba que éstos pudiesen escapar. También participó en el proceso de exterminio que constituía la razón de ser de Sobibor. Posteriormente, regresó de nuevo a Trawniki. El 1 de octubre de 1943, los alemanes ordenaron su traslado al Campo de Concentración de Flossenbürg. Llegó a este campo el 8 de octubre, fecha en que se le entregó un rifle y una bayoneta. Demjanjuk sirvió en Flossenbürg al menos hasta el 10 de diciembre de 1944, es decir, al menos durante catorce meses. Durante su servicio en este campo, vigilaba a los prisioneros e impedía que éstos pudiesen escapar." [...]

El Tribunal de Distrito para el Distrito Norte de Ohio consideró probado que "La prueba número 3 del Gobierno es una tarjeta de identificación de servicio en el Campo de Entrenamiento de Trawniki, emitida a nombre de Iwan Demjanjuk, con número de identificación 1393" y que "La prueba 3 del Gobierno es un Documento Alemán del Periodo de Guerra Auténtico, el cual le fue extendido al acusado", y "[S]e halla en un estado que no levanta sospecha alguna acerca de su autenticidad"...

Es de señalar que en febrero de 2009 la Fiscalía de Munich sometió nuevamente a pruebas periciales este documento y, tras considerar demostrada su autenticidad, procedió días después a solicitar la entrega de Demjanjuk.

En cuanto al servicio prestado por Demjanjuk en el campo de concentración de Flossenbürg, donde fueron hechos prisioneros más de 150 españoles, considera el Tribunal que "El 'Iwan Demianjuk' identificado en la entrada 53 del listado de traslados de Flossenbürg es el mismo guardia entrenado en Trawniki identificado en la Tarjeta de Identificación de Servicio No. 1393..."